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HONORABLE SVEN ERIK HOLMES".
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
PROFESSOR GARRETT: As a fourth generation Oklahoman-and no matter
how long I've been in Chicago, I will always be an Oklahoman-it is particularly
gratifying to appear before the Tenth Circuit today. Law and economics is the
strongest interdisciplinary force in the academy, so to think about its future is
challenging. It's hard to imagine a future as influential as its past. I want to talk
today about an application of law and economics that I expect to see in the future.
The topic may surprise you, because it's in an arena that we don't think of as
characterized by rational economic men and women or by logical rules and
regulations. That is the arena of the political process.
As members of the judiciary and the bar, you may have noticed that interesting
cases dealing with issues of the political process are increasingly coming to the
courts-cases on voting rights, term limits, the subjects of direct democracy, the
line-item veto, and delegation principles. As we continue to grapple with these
issues in the academy, in the bar, and in the judiciary, we may bring to bear the tools
of law and economics.
It should not surprise us that law and economics, sometimes called public choice
theory, has application to the political process. After all, politics is a market. Most
politicians in a modem democracy operate within the constraints of a competitive
electoral market. No matter why you're a politician-if you want to adopt your
vision of the best policies, if you're motivated by influence, prestige, and power, or
if you seek the benefits from special interests that accrue to those who are
lawmakers-you must be reelected in a competition, and that is the quintessential
market.
To put it another way, politics is a market where some people demand a
product-legislation-and lawmakers supply that product. Some groups are better
at demanding legislation than others. Those groups that can organize, obtain
financial resources, and present their views persuasively do better than those of us
unorganized, diffuse citizens who merely pay taxes to fund all those programs. So
just like any other market, we find the political market has market failures. What we
have to do as lawmakers, professors, judges, and lawyers is to implement structures
that ameliorate those market failures. The structures ought to take account of the fact
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that people acting within them are rational, self-interested people trying to obtain
certain objectives.
Now, to make this more concrete, I will apply the insights of law and economics
to a case that the Court handed down on Monday' in the political process area. The
case is CaliforniaDemocraticParty v. Jones,2 which deals with the blanket primary
in California. There are three opinions in the case; none of them explicitly talks
about law and economics. In a seven-to-two decision, Justice Scalia held that the
blanket primary imposed on the political parties in California was unconstitutional. 3
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence,4 and Justice Stevens wrote a dissent. 5 Both
the majority and the dissent would have benefited by more explicit discussion of the
principles of law and economics.
By way of background, a blanket primary is one of three ways of organizing a
primary in an electoral process. There is the traditional, closed primary, where
voters have to declare party affiliation before an election and vote in that party's
primary. There is an open primary, which currently twenty-one states use, where
voters don't have to declare that they are members of the party, but voters can vote
in only one party's primary.6 So in one election, a voter can vote in the Republican
primary. In another election, several months or years later, she can vote in the
Democratic primary.
The blanket primary, which three states use,7 is an unusual formation in that
voters can vote in different primaries for different offices in the same election. So
a voter can vote for the Democratic candidate for the governor, the Republican
candidate for the lieutenant governor, and the Green Party candidate, in the state
auditor's election. So in a way, this is a kind of menu. You go to a restaurant, and
you just pick and choose.
In California, the voters, by ballot initiative, decided that they would use the
blanket primary rather than the closed primary system, which the political parties
favored. 8 Justice Scalia applied traditional constitutional jurisprudence and decided
that the blanket primary was imposed on the parties unconstitutionally.' He said that
members of political parties have associational rights under the First Amendment.'0
Part of those rights is the ability to exclude nonmembers from certain activities, like
voting in a primary."

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

June 26, 2000.

7.

Those states are Alaska, Louisiana, and Washington. Ia

530 U.S. 567 (2000).
Id. at 577.
See id. at 586-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 590-603 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F.Supp. 1288, 1291 (E.D.Cal. 1997), rev'd by 530 U.S. 567

(2000).
8. The voters approved the adoption of the blanket primary system by supporting Proposition 198 in the
1996 state election. The measure was codified in CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2001 (2000).
9. California Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 572-77 (citing cases supporting "the freedom to join together
in furtherance of common political beliefs" and the right not to associate, see, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party

of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214-15 (1986)).
10. Id. at 574-75.
11. Id.
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That's an important right, but, of course, it's not an absolute right. No First
Amendment right is. So Justice Scalia analyzed the state interests that had been
brought forward to defend the blanket primary. He found that some were not
compelling, and, in some cases, the blanket primary was not narrowly tailored to
serve the interests." The interests that were identified by California in favor of the
blanket primary included making candidates more representative and less partisan,
of voters, 3who would no
increasing voter participation, and protecting the privacy
Democrats.
or
Republicans
are
they
whether
declare
to
longer have
Let me suggest how law and economics might have helped decide the case.4
Political parties in the political marketplace are very much like public utilities.
They have some private aspects, just as utilities do. We ought to be careful about
government intervention into the private aspects of political parties.
Political parties are also very public institutions, just like public utilities. The
of an
Court, in the term limits case a few years back, discussed the importance
5 That's all
us.'
represent
to
want
we
whom
choose
to
expansive freedom of voters
well and good to say, but realistically, our choice is constrained by who appears on
the ballot. And that decision is largely left up to the political parties. So, while
parties have some private elements, they also have a substantial impact on the
electoral process and the electoral marketplace. Some government regulation is
important and necessary; the question is what kind of regulation.
Justice Scalia, in finding that the blanket primary was too intrusive a regulation,
might have thought about the role of parties in organizing the political marketplace.
The political marketplace is a place where groups participate. You and I don't have
much influence as individuals. We have influence when we come together as a
group of people, sharing common and intense preferences, to lobby and participate.
6
Political parties are large intermediary structures where the activity of smaller
interest groups can take place and where the activities of those with intensive
preferences can be organized, made less chaotic, and rendered into a discernible and
relatively rational platform and ideology.
So these intermediating structures serve vital public interests. They structure the
government; they allow the Congress to work with the President and the judiciary.
They structure the electoral process and the party organization. They select, fund,
and organize candidates. Justice Scalia might have said that political parties are
important intermediary groups in our political marketplace, and we have to be wary
of rules and regulations that might weaken them substantially. After all, the intention
of the blanket primary was to weaken parties, and I think that would have been the
effect.
In addition, political parties provide cues for those of us who vote but, rationally,
do not spend twenty-four hours a day learning everything we can about every

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
(1999).

Id at 582-86.
Id
See LEON EPSTEIN, PoLrTCAL PARTIES INTHE AMERICAN MoLD 157 (1986).
See United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 819-21 (1995).
See Samuel Issaacaroff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L REV. 1627
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candidate for every office, from governor and president down to dogcatcher.17 But
when we go to the polls, rationally ignorant of many details about candidates, we
know that we might have more in common with a Democrat than we do with a
Republican, or vice versa. That's an important cue for us as rational voters. It helps
us vote competently with imperfect information. If the blanket primary system
would have reduced the value of that informational cue by decreasing party
differences, by making parties look very much like one another, so a Republican
would be no different from a Democrat from a Libertarian, etc., that development
would hurt us as voters. Justice Scalia could have made this point in support of
strong political parties, drawing from law-and-economics literature.
What about Justice Stevens and those who thought that the blanket primary was
an acceptable system, if the voters chose to adopt it? Here I will draw a bit on
corporate law. It may not surprise you that law and economics has an enormous
influence in the corporate field. Law and economics teaches us that if we want
managers and corporations to act consistently with our interests as shareholders and
not their own interests, we ought to have a competitive and robust market for
corporate control. We ought to make sure that managers know that shareholders
could, if they wanted to, replace them. Therefore, a strong marketplace for corporate
control will keep managers' interests aligned with shareholders more effectively
than any legal doctrine ever could.
Take that idea into the political marketplace. Our representatives are more likely
to represent us accurately and adequately if there is a robust electoral competition. 8
But, the rules of the political games are determined by the very people who play the
game. Incumbents and major political parties set the rules of the game, and they
select rules that benefit incumbents and major political parties. I'm sure that doesn't
surprise anybody here. They choose rules that make it harder for challengers, minor
parties, and new voices to be heard in the political marketplace.
What Justice Stevens might have said in his dissent is that the blanket primary is
a way to dislodge some of the entrenched political interests. And he might have
pointed out that this reform was adopted through direct democracy, one way to
circumvent entrenched interests. Initiatives allow the people to get around those who
are pursuing their self-interest at the expense of the public good.
How would the case have come out if the justices had applied a law-andeconomics perspective? It might lead to the conclusion that the harm to the political
parties, important intermediaries in a well-functioning political process, was greater
than the threats posed by a partisan lock-up. One fact supporting that conclusion is
that the Republican and Democrat parties were not alone in attacking the blanket
primary. The Libertarian and Peace parties,' 9 hardly entrenched players in any
political system, were also attacking the blanket primary. Nonetheless, we might feel
much more comfortable about that conclusion in this case if courts would generally

17. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L REV.
1533, 1544-50 (1999).
18. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politicsas Markets: Lockups of the DemocraticProcess,
50 STAN. L REv. 643 (1998); Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not
Allow the States to Protect the Democratsand Republicansfrom PoliticalCompetition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331.
19. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 571 (2000).
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recognize the potential threat of partisan lock-up, which is exacerbated by other laws
that keep voices from being heard in the political marketplace. For example, ballot
access laws keep independent and minor parties off the ballot and other state laws
prohibit fusion candidacies. The entrenched interests, primarily the two major
political parties, pass these laws to protect themselves and drown out other voices.'
In other words, law and economics doesn't entirely change the judicial inquiry;
we still have to balance interests to reach conclusions. What law and economics
provides is a different structure to shape the balancing process in a more rigorous
and thoughtful way. We will continue to apply that perspective to various legal
problems in the breakout session after lunch. Thank you.
PANEL DISCUSSION
GARRETT: Let me introduce the two panelists who have joined me to talk more
about law and economics. We have, to use a law-and-economics term, entered into
a precommitment arrangement that we will each speak for only about ten minutes.
So, we will have plenty of time to open up discussion about the principles and how
they might affect your work.
Let me introduce the two illustrious panelists on either side of me. Professor Art
LeFrancois attended Beloit College, 2' and he earned his J.D. at the University of
Chicago Law School. So he's perfect for a law-and-economics panel, given his
training. He is now a professor at the Oklahoma City University Law School, where
he works primarily in the areas of criminal law, criminal procedure, and
jurisprudence. He's currently at work now on a number of revisions to the
Oklahoma Constitution.
On my other side is a good friend of mine, Judge Sven Holmes of the Northern
District of Oklahoma. He did his undergraduate work at Harvard, earned his J.D.
from the other fine law school that I've been affiliated with, the University of
Virginia Law School, and received his L.L.M. from Georgetown. He clerked for
Judge Brett;22 he was the administrative assistant to the Governor of Oklahoma, the
staff director and general counsel for the Senate Intelligence Committee, and a
partner at Williams & Connolly,23 specializing in business law. One of the things
that he has done that I found most interesting, and that I didn't know before, is that
he's also been the vice president of the Baltimore Orioles.
So, we will talk a little bit about law and economics. Art's going to talk about it
in the context of criminal law and criminal procedure. I'm going to focus on
campaign finance, and then I'll discuss a case that's currently before the court, Cook
v. Gralike,24 which is a case dealing with ballot notations. Judge Holmes is going to
conclude by applying law and economics to an area in which he works everyday,
sexual harassment law.

20. See

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

117-130 (2000).

21. Beloit, Wisconsin.
22. Honorable Thomas R. Brett. District Judge, United States District Court, Northern District of Oklahoma.

23. Washington, D.C.
24. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 121 S. Ct. 1029 (2001). At the time of this panel discussion, the case

had not yet been decided.
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PROFESSOR LEFRANCOIS: We might think of economics as a way to predict
human behavior. The more we know about individual and group preferences, the
better we can predict what people and institutions are likely to do. Traditional
economics assumes we are rational agents. And liberal traditions counsel that
governments defer-as best they can-to the preferences of individuals. Current
conservatism certainly counsels this deference relative to the marketplace.
But sometimes people seem not to do what traditional models, based on rational,
self-interested actors, would suggest. I want to talk about these aberrations and their
relevance to criminal law. I will do so by exploiting the work of one former and two
current colleagues of Professor Garrett's: Dan Kahan, Tracey Meares, and Cass
Sunstein.2 5 Anything of value that I have to say is attributable to them.
I am going to talk about things called norms and what they have to tell us about
criminal justice policy and questions they raise about the wisdom and propriety of
certain kinds of governmental intervention in the affairs of people. This is relevant
to us today because some of the things that norm-related scholarship has
suggested-some policing techniques and criminalization efforts-are quite hotly
contested in city councils, state houses, and courtrooms.
First, a bit about seemingly irrational, you might call it diseconomic, behavior.
Ask yourself why you haven't robbed an individual or institution recently. Is it
because you---even unconsciously-have calculated costs and benefits? Is it because
you are risk-averse? How about a more likely case, then: simple larceny? You are
visiting your addled older relative. You could use several hundred dollars to buy a
nice gift for someone. Your relative has no chance of discovering your pilfering.
And if he did, no one would believe him. And you don't like this relative, not even
a little bit. And he doesn't need the money. Is it the law that stops you? More likely,
it is your superego. I mean the one Freud talked about; I am not talking about the
judges here. But maybe, as a group, we are different. Maybe we need the law to
keep those other folks in line.
How about this one? There is a game with two players.26 Player One is given a
sum of money. If she gives any of the money to the other player, and the other
player accepts it, they both get to keep their respective shares. On the other hand,
they both lose their money if Player One offers none of it to Player Two, or if Player
Two rejects the gift. We might have thought that rationally self-interested actors in
the role of Player One would give a minimal amount to Player Two, who, as a
similarly rational, self-interested actor, would accept. What happens instead is
that-across many cultures and different stake levels-offers average between 30
to 40 percent of the total.
Two last examples. What happens when we offer a risk-neutral person an
opportunity to trade a sum of money for a range of possible sums, the average of
which is greater than the initial sum? 27 The answer is, probably nothing, if the trade

25. Tracey L Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and(Norms oJ) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REv.
805 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998);
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, in CHICAGO LECTURES INLAW AND ECONOMICS 135 (Eric A.
Posner, ed., 2000).
26. The example is from Sunstein, supra note 25, at 135.
27. The example is from Kahan, supra note 25, at 609-10.
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looks like tax evasion. But if the trade looks like casino gambling, it will likely be
made, even if the average value of the sums in the range of possibilities is less than
the initial sum. I know this last part is true, having recently spent an afternoon with
my wife in Atlantic City.
Finally, why do we have gang-ridden neighborhoods where juveniles do not think
there is an intrinsic value to gang membership, and why do these same juveniles
participate in street nightlife when they do not find it intrinsically valuable and may
even fear it?28Increasingly, academics think the answers to these questions lie in the
realm of norms-what anthropologists might call mores, parents might call peer
pressure, and retailers might call fashion.
We might find here answers to other questions as well, like why nearly twentythree percent of white teenagers smoke, compared to less than five percent of
African-American teenagers. 29 The answers will not surprise any of you, but
thinking about these issues more systematically than we usually do will raise some
important questions regarding law enforcement strategies and criminalization.
The reason you have not stolen money, even from your addled relative, is that
you would violate a deeply held convention if you did so. You would think less of
yourself.30 In the two-player game, Player One is concerned about being perceived
as fair, as not greedy. 3' In our other exchange game, the reason the trade resembling
gambling will occur is that it conjures up images of play and spiritedness, while the
32
trade resembling tax evasion raises notions of cheating and dishonor. We have
gangs in neighborhoods where kids do not want them because the costs of acting
like you do not want them are unacceptably high, and so there is a resulting
33
perception that everyone wants them-because everyone is acting like they do.
Kids who do not admire gang members think others do. There is sometimes a
disconnect between reality and perception, and it is sometimes exacerbated by a
disconnect between what we believe and what we act like we believe.
The common element here is that people conduct themselves quite rationally, but
only after one takes into account the background norms against which they operate.
This is important for criminal justice. Traditionally, we have modeled criminal
justice policy along deterrence lines. We care about swiftness, surety, and severity
can
of punishment. 34 There is much to be said for this view. The problem is that it
35
results.
counter-productive
and
obtuse,
morally
ineffective,
lead to expensive,
Standard deterrence analysis would not predict that increasing the cost of lowlevel crime would deter more serious crime.36 But it seems to. When police impose
low-tolerance or order-maintenance procedures, they aggressively respond to such

28. These examples are from Meares & Kahan, supra note 25, at 819, 821.
29. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 136.
30. Current norm theory focuses on social meaning, the meanings others take from the ways we act. One
of the points of this example is that social meaning and norms affect us even when no one is watching.
31. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 160.
32. Kahan, supra note 25, at 610.
33. Meares & Kahan, supra note 25, at 819.
34. Id. at 826.
35. Cf. Kahan, supra note 25, at 616 (criticizing as morally problematic and politically unworkable criminal
law policy prescriptions that focus on deterrence-related cost-effectiveness at the expense of social meaning).
36. This point and the following discussion derive from Meares & Kahan, supra note 25, at 822-23.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

non-serious offenses as panhandling, prostitution, property defacement, and public
intoxication. The result is reducing more serious crimes like burglary, robbery, and
theft. The reason, it is suggested, is that governmentally tolerated visible signs of
unlawful disorder signal an invitation to more serious criminality, cause law-abiders
to move away or stay off the street, and disrupt trust between neighbors and between
neighbors and police. Taking seriously the lower-order disorders breaks this
sequence. This is an example of a big bang for a small criminal justice buck, an alltoo-rare occurrence in politically driven criminal justice policy. The incidence of
serious crime decreases without the imposition of expensive costs in the form of
draconian penalties for such serious criminality.
Making punishments more severe can actually increase the incidence of the
penalized behavior. Take the case of juveniles with guns.37 In some neighborhoods,
it is a very bad idea not to have a gun, not so much for direct protection, although
that is part of it, but because of what not carrying a weapon signifies. It signifies
weakness and vulnerability and an unwillingness to defy authority. Standard
deterrence theory tells us to heavily penalize those who fail to turn their guns in and
to reward those who do. The problem is that this policy increases the value of gun
possession, because it intensifies the social meaning of carrying a gun-it
dramatizes the defiance and confidence of the gun possessor.
Better policy seems to suggest we reward juveniles who rat out their gun
possessing peers. Why? The communicative value-the social meaning--of gun
possession is reduced when kids fear that if they display their weapons, they may
be turned in. And the thought that peers might snitch on gun possessors conflicts
with the idea that peers naturally confer high status on gun possessors. Again, note
the efficiencies for criminal justice. Paying informants works more deterrence than
rewarding cooperators (those who turn in their weapons) and punishing noncooperators.
Another anti-gun policy that works is the low tolerance or order-maintenance
crackdown.3" Here, members of violent gangs are the targets of crackdowns relating
to low-order crimes such as public intoxication and unregistered vehicles. They are
told such crackdowns will continue as long as gang violence does. Kids who are
willing to risk severe gun-related penalties are unwilling to live under the crackdown
regime. Why? In part, it seems to be that only a small number of kids are strongly
committed to gang violence and, just as importantly, house arrest for a silly offense
simply does not have the cachet of a prison term. Finally, kids can exit potentially
violent scenarios without losing face. It is more honorable to seek to avoid an order
maintenance crackdown and to treat its subsequent trivial penalties as a mere hassle,
than to act as though one fears prison. There are other examples of 39similarly
effective enforcement strategies-loitering and curfew laws among them.
Now, let me make two points about the law. The first is general. What business
is it of the government, through legislation, enforcement, and adjudication, to seek

37. See id. at 824-25 for the analysis from which the following discussion is drawn.
38. See id. at 825-27 for the analysis from which the following discussion is drawn.
39. See id. at 819-22; Kahan, supra note 25, at 614-15.
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to change the rational preferences of individuals?' Is it proper for the law to seek
to influence or abolish certain norms, or to create different norms that will guide
behavior more effectively and directly than the law itself can? The argument for
intervention is that while society produces norms, individuals often can do little to
change them.4 ' An example is organized hockey.4 2 What is a player signaling if he
wears a helmet, or says he wants to? Whatever he is signaling, it is not going to help
him much on the ice, is it? So what will he say when he is asked if he would like to
wear a helmet? He will say no. There is a disconnect between his actions, including
his public speech, and his real desire. If the league mandates helmets, all the players
have a graceful way out. It is a bit like the boys' gym class being rained out the day
they were going to throw the shot put.
It is the same with curfews.43 Kids want them, but they cannot say so or
unilaterally exit nighttime street-life. The social meaning cost of so doing is
unacceptably high. It is a collective action problem. We get trapped in webs of
norms that we cannot individually change. Government can solve the collective
action problem by seeking to alter the norms that limit autonomy.
This is the second point about law: We need to be a little careful here. Can we
target members of violent gangs for order maintenance crackdowns without
violating, say, the Fourth Amendment, due process, or equal protection? Can we do
so without engaging or reinforcing ethnic or racial stereotypes? In an era of racial
profiling and metropolitan police shooting unarmed minorities, how comfortable are
we with some of the strategies suggested by norm theory'?"
The case of Chicago v. Morales45 involved Chicago's Gang Congregation
Ordinance, which sought to prohibit gang members from loitering. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the ordinance was impermissibly vague and so violated due
process." The Supreme Court of the United States agreed. Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, said that the ordinance failed to "establish minimal guidelines to
govern law enforcement." 47 Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented. Justices O'Connor and Breyer, concurring, noted,48 as did Justice
Stevens's opinion for the majority, 9 that a similar ordinance might be salvageable.
Perhaps it could target only those reasonably believed to be gang members, require
the loitering to have a harmful purpose, or have area and manner restrictions.'
Norm theorists had hoped that such an ordinance would exploit the fact that
teenagers in high-crime neighborhoods find neither gangs nor being on the streets

40. See Sunstein, supra note 25, at 161-73 for a discussion of the propriety of changing norms through
governmental intervention.
41. Id. at 162, 169, 173.
42. Id. at 162.
43. See Meares & Kahan, supra note 25, at 821.
44. In this connection, assurances that racially disparate police brutalization is on the wane are likely to be
hotly contested or treated as beside the point. See id. at 831 for an example of such an assurance.
45. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
46. City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 59 (111.), affdby 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
47. Morales, 530 U.S. at61 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) and Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
48. Id. at 66 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 63.
50. Id.
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at night intrinsically valuable, and would have an excuse for exiting."' Severely
penalizing gang activity increases its value through its enhanced social meanings of
defiance and courage." Anti-loitering statutes, however, like the crackdown
strategies I mentioned earlier, work to diffuse perceptions of the high status of gang
activity.53 But the Court disallowed the Chicago ordinance. As Professors Kahan and
Meares point out, inner-city residents help put in place such ordinances, while
suburbanites help undo them. It is a case, they suggest, of civil rights theory undoing
civil rights.54
Finally, think for a moment about the costs we impose on neighborhoods when
we remove large numbers of the young adult male population.55 We can do this, if
we want, using current drug laws. Despite the fact that there is not a significant
black/white differential in overall illicit drug use rates (although it is true, for
example, that LSD and methamphetamine tend to be "white" drugs), we generally
enforce many drug laws disproportionately in African-American neighborhoods,
against African Americans. We tear neighborhoods apart and put disproportionate
numbers of young African-American males in prison.
What if we focused on buyers, instead? 56 Buyers, even in black, inner-city
neighborhoods, are ethnically diverse. Policing programs launched against them
would not devastate single neighborhoods, but would have minimal impact on a
multiplicity of neighborhoods. Deterrence would occur, and the costs to
neighborhood social organization would be reduced. As neighborhoods disintegrate,
crime gets worse. As more sons and fathers (and daughters and mothers) are hauled
off to prison, neighborhoods disintegrate. And so it goes.
So, norm theorists suggest that we keep in mind that enforcement and
criminalization strategies can have unintended effects, that we can affect behavior
and reduce unintended and counterproductive consequences by attending to and
changing norms. They also suggest that people, like teenagers in gang-infested,
high-crime neighborhoods, rationally carry guns and act aggressively, while being
otherwise disposed not to. A wise and efficient criminal justice policy would seek
to reduce the social meaning costs of violating certain community norms and thus
ultimately change those norms themselves. Norm theory gives us ways to do this
that are politically marketable (we are not talking about community service or
paying fines for serious crime)57 and morally tolerable,58 and that will strengthen
neighborhood organization and so reduce crime.59
GARRETT: Thank you. I think those examples show the future of law and
economics. We're using more evidence of behavioral norms based on empirical
51. See Meares & Kahan, supranote 25, at 830.
52. Kahan, supra note 21, at 614.
53. Id.
54. Meares & Kahan, supra note 25, at 830-32.
55. See id. at 816-19 for a discussion of this problem.
56. See id for a discussion of "reverse stings," where law enforcement officers pose as drug dealers and
arrest those who seek to purchase narcotics.
57. See Kahan, supra note 25, at 616 (noting legally and morally obtuse messages sent by community
service sentences and fines).
58. See Sunstein, supra note 25, at 162-73 (considering objections to paternalism). Not all intervention in
the name of norm theory is morally appropriate, but some norm-based interventionist strategies clearly are.
59. Meares & Kahan, supra note 25, at 832.
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studies and relying less on unrealistic assumptions that all people act rationally at
all times. I just want to talk briefly about two areas where insights about the political
marketplace may be important. My focus is on two cases, one that just came down
and one that the Court is going to be considering next term. 60
The first is the area of campaign finance reform. Law and economics is useful for
those of us trying to write campaign finance laws and those of us trying to decide
whether those laws are constitutional or wise policy. I would suggest three ways in
which law and economics can help campaign finance reform efforts and our analysis
of those efforts.
First, we might look at many campaign finance rules as further examples of
partisan lock-ups. Most of the rules regulating the electoral marketplace are passed
by incumbents, and it shouldn't surprise us that it appears as though some laws favor
incumbents and make it more difficult for challengers to mount effective
challenges.6'Buckley v. Valeo, the very controversial opinion decided in 1976, was
a case brought mainly by challengers, not incumbents.62 These were outsiders
arguing that the Federal Election Campaign Act made it more difficult for them to
win against incumbents. For example, the presidential financing system ruled
constitutional by Buckley v. Valeo gives public money to major parties, but makes
it very difficult for minor parties and new parties to participate in a strong and robust
electoral competition.
If we think about these laws in terms of their potential to contribute to partisan
lock-up, we have to view them with some skepticism. Having said that, one of the
interesting recent developments is that several campaign finance reform laws, which
have been adopted primarily on the state level,63 have come about as a result of
direct democracy. So here you have campaign finance reform coming from groups
other than the entrenched players. Often these state efforts are threatening to the
entrenched players. So perhaps courts ought to consider looking at the product of
direct democracy and the product of representative democracy in different ways.
Courts occasionally do that, but tend to discount the result of direct democracy as
uninformed and unruly. That's not the case in all contexts.
The second insight from law and economics about campaign finance reform is
that we should be very careful about unintended consequences." I think you see this
concern expressed in some of the recent opinions from the Supreme Court, most
notably in Shrink Missouri Government PAC,65 the case that upheld the Missouri
law that imposed very strict contribution limits on Missouri state campaigns. Justice
Kennedy wrote an important dissent in which he said he was concerned because
60. This panel discussion was given on July 1, 2000, just after the conclusion of the October 1999 term.
61. See Lillian R. Bevier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1258 (1994).

62. The plaintiffs in that case included a candidate for the presidency of the United States, a United States
senator who was a candidate for re-election, a potential contributor, the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency
McCarthy '76, the Conservative Party of the State of New York, the Mississippi Republican Party, the libertarian
Party, the New York Civil Liberties Union, Inc., the American Conservative Union, the Conservative Victory Fund,
and Human Events, Inc. Buckley v. Valeo,424 U.S. 1, 8 (1976).
63. At the time of these remarks, federal reform efforts were stalled.
64. See STEVEN M. GILLON, "THAT'S NOT WHAT WE INTENDED TO Do": REFORM AND ITSUNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (2000).

65.

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
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courts consider these laws case by case, and judges don't think about how
everything interacts." We get this kind of crazy campaign finance system that is full
of gaps and loopholes in part because judges have to proceed case by case.
So, for example, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court said that Congress can limit
contributions, but can't limit independent expenditures.67 What happens next?
Everybody shifts money into independent expenditures. That's the hydraulic quality
of political money. 8 Or, as I say in my classes, that's the jello-like quality of
political money. You tamp it down one place; it just springs up in another. If you try
to tamp down issue ads or independent expenditures, interest groups, parties, and
candidates will figure out another way to spend money. The money is going to be
spent if it's in the interest of people to influence political outcomes. The lesson: Be
very careful how you regulate, and be very careful as judges about what you allow
and what you don't allow because behavior will shift in response, often in
unforeseeable ways.
In Shrink Missouri,Justice Kennedy warned that we should be careful about how
cases dealing with political parties interact with cases dealing with independent
expenditures.69 His overall observation-that we should beware of unintended
consequences-is one that would be supported by law and economics.
My third point is that applying law and economics to campaign finance reform
underscores the importance of disclosure. I would like to see the Court adopt as a
compelling state interest" in these cases the need to facilitate voter competence-to
provide voters with the information they need in order to vote with limited
information the same way they would if they had full information.7 The state has
a compelling interest in ensuring that voters choose candidates who will vote in
ways that are consistent with the voters' ideology. In that effort, the state has to take
into account the fact that we are all busy people. We're not going to spend a great
deal of time leaming everything relevant about each and every candidate. So
reformers should figure out ways to give voters the information they need to cast
competent votes, but not expect them to spend twenty-four hours a day getting that
information.
What information is helpful? Party cue is helpful. It's also helpful to know the
identity of big donors in campaigns. I can look at a campaign and say, "Oh, Kerr-

66. Id. at 408.
67. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
68. Samuel Issacbaroff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics ofCampaign Finance Reform, 77 TEx. L REv.
1705 (1999).
69. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 406-07.
70. Because campaign finance regulations implicate the Fst Amendment, states must provide a compelling
interest for imposing such regulations. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (requiring exacting scrutiny of campaign finance
regulations); see also Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 386-87 (discussing appropriate level of scrutiny for campaign
finance regulations).
71. See Elizabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia. Voter Competence in Direct Elections, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE
AND DEMOCRATIC INSTrruTIONS 147, 149 (1999).
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McGee 2 gave money to that candidate," or "Greenpeace' gave money to that
candidate." That signal informs me whether the candidate is more, or less, likely to
vote the way I want her to. So I think it's very important that Congress pass the
pending disclosure
statute with respect to Section 527 organizations, the so-called
74
"Stealth PACs."
It's also important to use the Internet to disseminate as much information as
quickly as possible about sources of money in campaigns. Ironically, that may mean
we don't want to enact limits on contributions. It's actually helpful to know that
Greenpeace or Kerr-McGee spent substantial amounts of money on a candidate. It's
important to provide that information in a way that's transparent to voters. So a lawand-economics perspective may move us to a system of aggressive disclosure,
justified on the typical ground of unearthing corruption, and also on the ground of
improving voter competence. Law and economics may not support many other
campaign finance regulations.
The second case I want to focus on briefly is a case that will be before the
Supreme Court in the next term, Cook v. Gralike.7 ' That case deals with the
constitutionality of what many call "informed voter ballot notations,"'76 or what those
people who don't like them call "scarlet letter notations." ' The notations in this case
concern previous term limits. This is the way that the U.S. Term Limits group
responded to the term limits case, where the Court held that states cannot impose
term limits on federal lawmakers.78 In response, U.S. Term Limits and other interest
groups decided to use the ballot to put pressure on federal lawmakers to pass term
limits. In a number of states, including Missouri, they told candidates that they had
to decide whether or not they were going to pledge to support term limits. If they
didn't, then on the ballot, next to their names in all capital letters, would appear the
words, "DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS. '' 7 9 For
72. The Kerr-McGee Corporation is an energy and chemical company engaged in oil and gas exploration
and production, titanium dioxide pigment manufacturing and marketing, and minerals mining and marketing. Based
in Oklahoma City, it has assets of more than $7.7 billion. See http://www.kerr-mcgee.com (last visited March 28,
2001).
73. Greenpeace is an international organization devoted to environmental activism. See
http://www.greenpeaceusa.org (last visited March 28, 2001).
74. Section 527 organizations are those political groups organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. § 527. Section 527 defines a political organization as "a party committee, association, fund or other
organization ... organized and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or
making expenditures or both... [for the purpose of] influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination,
election or appointment of an individual to a federal, state or local public office or office in a political organization."
26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(1). Under Section 527, candidate committees, party committees, and political action committees
(PACs) receive preferential tax treatment that recognizes their special status. The code states that contributions these
committees raise are not considered taxable income. Those groups were exempt from federal disclosure
requirements until the passage of a bill sponsored by Rep. Amo Houghton. See Act of July 1.2000, Pub. L No. 106230 (amending the Internal Revenue Service code of 1986 to require 527 organizations to disclose their political
activities).
75.

That case was decided on February 28, 2001. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 121 S. Ct. 1029

(invalidating Missouri law requiring that the failure of any senator or representative to use their authority to amend
the Constitution to impose term limits would be noted on the ballot).
76. Id. at -_,121 S.Ct. at 1033-34.
77.

See Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L REV.

1533 (1999).
78. United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
79. Gralike, 531 U.S. at ______, 121 S.Ct. at 1033-34.
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lawmakers who didn't vote in favor of term limits in the U.S. Congress, next to their
names would appear the words, "DISREGARDED VOTERS' INSTRUCTIONS ON
TERM LIMITS." ° In other words, the voters would use notations to hold
lawmakers accountable for this vote.
These ballot notations were immediately attacked, and in every state where
1
constitutional challenges were brought they were struck down as unconstitutional."
There are, of course, a variety of constitutional reasons for those decisions. But I
think most people just looked at this innovation and thought, "Oh, that's wrong.
There is just something repugnant about putting such information on the ballot. It
doesn't belong on the ballot." You can figure out constitutional reasons for the
decisions, but I think much of it stems from a quick reaction of repulsion.
Law and economics would suggest that this reaction might have been too quick,
because the ballot already contains information. It's not a question, as Justice
Rehnquist has argued in some other opinions, of making the ballot an advertising
document or keeping it pristine. 2 It's not pristine now. It has information on it. It
identifies the candidate's party affiliation. That's important information for voter
competence. In many cases, voters can tell from the name of the candidate what
ethnicity he or she is, and that is a very strong voting cue for many voters. Gender
is a voting cue, and that information is often apparent. Some ballots indicate who's
an incumbent, another voting cue. So the question is not whether we ought to put
information on the ballot, the question really is, what information ought to go on the
ballot, and is there something wrong about this particular kind of information?
I find ballot notations are an interesting way to get new voices into the political
process. They are also a way to provide better information to voters. It might be very
helpful for a voter to know that a Democrat favors term limits. That tells the voter
more about that person's ideology, not with respect to term limits necessarily, but
just generally with respect to the issues that are going to be in front of her as she
votes during her term of office.
The problem is that these particular notations seem loaded. "DISREGARDED
VOTERS' WISHES ON TERM LIMITS." Even if you don't like term limits, that
notation signals that the candidate is a person of bad character, because this person
acted contrary to the wishes of the voters. It shouldn't surprise you that the group
that wrote these ballot notations, U.S. Term Limits, worked to figure out what words

80. Id.
81. See Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 1999) (invalidating Nebraska initiative on the grounds that
it violated Article V of the Constitution and the right to vote); Barker v. Hazeltine, 3 F.Supp.2d 1088 (D.S.D. 1998)

(invalidating South Dakota initiative on Article V,First Amendment, and due process grounds); League of Women
Voters v. Gwadosky, 966 F.Supp. 52 (D.Me. 1997) (invalidating Maine initiative on Article V grounds); Bramberg
v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1999) (invalidating California initiative on Article V grounds); Morrissey v. State,
951 P.2d 911 (Colo. 1998) (invalidating Colorado initiative on Article V and Guarantee Clause grounds); Simpson
v. Cenarmsa, 944 P.2d 1372 (Idaho 1997) (invalidating Idaho initiative on First Amendment Speech and Debate
Clause and state constitutional grounds but finding that initiative did not violate Article V); Donavan v. Priest, 931
S.W.2d 119 (Ark. 1996) (invalidating Arkansas initiative on Article V grounds); In re Initiative Petition No. 364,
930 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1996) (invalidating Oklahoma initiative on Article V and state constitutional grounds).
82. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 365 (upholding Minnesota law that
prohibited multi-party, "fusion," candidates from adding descriptive labels to their party name because such labels
"would undermine the ballot's purpose by transforming it from a means of choosing candidates to a billboard for
political advertising").
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evoked the strongest response on the part of voters, whether or not the voters were
in favor of term limits. Again, law and economics tells us that the kind of
information given and the frame for that information are extraordinarily important.
The words that appear on the ballot at the crucial moment of voters' decisions are
going to have significant, perhaps determinative, influence on the outcome of the
election.
You can even argue that this kind of binary description-this on/off switch that
says a candidate is either for or against term limits-is a confusing way to present
information. You can be for term limits but uncomfortable with particularly short
term limits, or you can be uncomfortable with particularly long term limits. These
notations don't give a voter that more nuanced information.
I'll leave you with one thought before we turn to Judge Holmes. If ballot
notations sound weird to you, understand that this is not the first time ballot
notations have been used. The Seventeenth Amendment was passed in part because
of ballot notations. The Seventeenth Amendment provides for the direct election of
senators. In the West, people who wanted to take the election of senators away from
legislatures and put the election into the popular realm decided to use ballot
notations in their effort. State lawmakers had to pledge to elect to the Senate the
person who won a popular vote in the state. If they didn't take the pledge, then the
ballot would indicate that fact. The ballot would indicate that the lawmaker wasn't
going to honor the people's choice in a popular vote. If the candidate did pledge to
support popular election of senators, the state would put that information on the
ballot. So by the time the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified and adopted, in
many states senators were essentially elected directly because of the ballot notation
process.
We certainly are seeing more and more discussion of ballot notations. In Arizona,
a ballot notation that would have required people to pledge to replace the current
income tax with the consumption tax was just recently defeated.83 The notation
would have read, "Signed the IRS Elimination Pledge." These proposals are
surfacing more and more.
HOLMES: Prof. Garrett asked me to join the panel to discuss whether, and to
what extent, law and economics has an effect on what federal judges do. In
considering this question, I went back and reviewed the kinds of things that we trial
judges do for a living-that is, the matters that are on our docket. I found that
certain types of cases have a very clear law-and-economics component, and in others
the law-and-economics component is more subtle.
First, cases dealing with breach of contract, which present predominantly
business issues, necessarily implicate law and economics. If we focus on Judge
Posner's formulation of man as a rational maximizer of self interest," then when a
contract has a gap of some kind, or fails to cover the instant case, we can assume the
cost of providing for or foreseeing the missing term, as judged by the parties, was
too high. At the same time, the rest of the document is meant to be more than a
83. See Steve Yozwaik and Dennis Wagner, Voters Choose Amendments for Changing System, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, November 4, 1998, at A1; Michael Murphy, Prop. 202 a Shot Over Bow of IRS: Hopefuls Would Vow
to Kill Taxing Agency, ARIZONA REPUBuC, October 25, 1998, at B4.
84. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1998).
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guidepost on how to interpret the contract. It's meant to tell you, in fact, what was
the articulated self-interest of this particular economic transaction.
So, as you try to divine the intent of the parties, you are necessarily trying to
determine what economic incentives each party had in mind when entering the
transaction. This in turn helps guide how you would allocate the benefits, burdens,
risks, and responsibilities, when something happens that was not specifically
covered by the contract, which happens all the time.
When that occurs, we look to the language of the contract. And as we're looking
to the language, we are actually looking to the underlying transaction to understand
where the parties are going and where they thought they would go. So the question
becomes, if the parties could step back in time to the point at which they were
developing this contract, how would they likely allocate the risks of this particular
event?
Law and economics also comes into play in federal anti-discrimination statutes.
That's an area that I focused upon, in part, because it's an area of real significance
to federal judges' dockets. At least this is true in my district. Some ten percent of all
cases filed deal with some federal anti-discrimination statute, whether it's the ADA 85
or ADEA86 or Title VII. 7 These statutes give rise to an enormous part of what we
do as federal judges. More than twenty percent of actual trials arise under these
statutes, because they're very difficult, fact-based cases that often can't be addressed
on summary judgment.
So I went back and looked at an issue that had vexed the courts of appeals and the
district courts for a number of years before the Supreme Court addressed it in 1998
in Faragherv. City ofBoca Raton"8 and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth.8 9 And that
is the question of employer liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment in the
workplace. I went back to examine this particular issue for two reasons. First, as I
mentioned, it's a matter that is on our dockets routinely. Second, it's an area where
the law aims to recognize the economic implications of the workplace and tries in
some way to allocate the benefits and burdens of workplace conduct.
Keep in mind that law and economics contemplates that people will respond
favorably to incentives and unfavorably to disincentives. Accordingly, I went back
and looked at two opinions that, in my judgment, were significant in this area. The
first is the 1998 opinion Harrison v. Eddy Potash,90 which was decided by Judge
Briscoe of the Tenth Circuit before the Supreme Court resolved these issues in the

85. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
86. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 (Supp. 111994).
87. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Subchapter VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1994).
88. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (holding that an employer is subject to vicarious
liability under Title Vil to a victimized employee for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor, but employer
may raise an affirmative defense that looks to the reasonableness of employer's conduct in seeking to prevent and
correct harassing conduct and to the reasonableness of employee's conduct in seeking to avoid harm).
89. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742(1998) (holding that in those cases in which employee
has suffered no tangible job consequences as a result of supervisor's actions, employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages showing that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior and that employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided).
90. Harrison v. Eddy Potash. Inc., 112 F.3d 1437(10th Cir. 1997), vacated by 524 U.S. 947, remanded to
158 F.3d 1371 (10th Cir. 1998).
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cases I mentioned earlier. Harrisonwas her effort to try to explain and apply legal
principles to the question of supervisor liability for sexual harassment in the
workplace. I consider this one of the great, well meaning, and truly unworkable
opinions of all time. It is great because it's exhaustive. In an effort to determine
when an employer should be responsible for an offending supervisor, it dealt with
every possible application of the principles of agency. It extended agency principles
through the notions of apparent authority and delegated authority, and articulated
a series of bases upon which the employer could be held responsible for supervisor
conduct. 9' In the end, Judge Briscoe's guiding principle was that it was absolutely
necessary to impose some form of strict liability on employers for supervisor
misconduct.9 2 She also determined that that could be done through principles of
agency.93
I can tell you-having had a jury trial in which we undertook to apply and
develop instructions based on Eddy Potash, and after a two-and-a-half hour
discussion with the jury after the verdict was rendered-that Eddy Potash was
absolutely unworkable. Not because the effort wasn't properly placed-indeed I
think her focus on strict liability was entirely correct-but rather because the
principles of agency didn't reach the workplace conduct that was involved.
The Seventh Circuit took a completely different approach from Eddy Potash
when it considered Burlington Industries v. Ellerth," before it went up to the
Supreme Court, and Jansen,95 a companion case. Judge Posner issued a particularly
interesting opinion in Jansen,concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which he
discussed both cases. Notwithstanding his strong law-and-economics pedigree,
Judge Posner declined to get too deeply into the economic aspect of the issue, and
he, like Judge Briscoe, tried to stretch the application of legal principles to
workplace conduct. Judge Posner, however, expressly rejected any application of
agency law, declaring it entirely inapposite, and chose instead to formulate a theory
of negligence in the workplace.9 In his view, everybody should be subject to a
negligence standard. 97 He rejected the argument that escalating from negligence to
strict liability would in any way affect primary conduct in the workplace."
So Judge Posner wanted to impose a negligence standard. But how does that
work? The answer, again, is that in this case legal doctrine alone doesn't work. So
that's what the Supreme Court was left with. It wasn't just these two opinions. In
fact, every circuit had been trying to come up with some way to deal with this
problem," and unsuccessfully so, in part because lower courts are limited by
91. See id. at 1444-46.
92. Id. at 1447.
93. See id. at 1444-47.
94. Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 102 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd by 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
95. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
96. Id. at 507-10.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 511-12.
99. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1998) (employee's reporting of alleged
sexual harassment to maintenance manager and her immediate supervisor put employer on actual notice of alleged
harassment); Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that employer knew or should
have known of supervisor's sexually harassing behavior and failed to take proper remedial action was supported
by sufficient evidence); Harris v. L.&L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1997) (employees' repeated, specific

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

existing legal principles. It is not for us to decide that we're going to bring to the
analysis pure law-and-economics principles, because we trial judges are limited by
precedent.
Judge Briscoe was certainly correct that strict liability was necessary, but I think
she was incorrect that agency principles could get you where you wanted to go to
affect primary conduct. Conversely, Judge Posner was correct that agency principles
didn't work, but I think incorrect in the notion that negligence, as opposed to strict
liability, would meet the requirements.
This is the context in which the Supreme Court considered these various cases.
But instead of trying to figure out how the current legal doctrines worked, it seems
to me that the Supreme Court properly took a step back and recognized the
inadequacy of those legal principles. The Court also understood the economic
principles that were guiding workplace behavior.
Now a lot of economic modeling has been done about discrimination in the
workplace, and what the economic theorists tell us is that discrimination in the
workplace, particularly co-worker discrimination, creates an enormous force to
develop two separate, segregated workplaces. That is an all-male workplace in one
shop, and an all-female workplace in another shop. This is because there are costs
imposed by somebody who has a taste for discrimination and therefore doesn't want
to work next to a woman. There are also costs created by workers who engage in
harassing behavior, in that either that employee, or the woman who's the object of
his harassment, will become less productive. All of these are costs that are incurred
by employers, so there's a force to create segregated workplaces. As a result, those
people who may have a taste for discrimination won't come in contact with the
object of their discrimination, and vice versa.
Of course, the fundamental principle that even starts the analysis for the Supreme
Court is that you can't have segregated workplaces, because employers would then
impose discriminatory criteria as the primary decision of hiring. So you've got this
enormous force pushing outward, and yet, at the same time, the one thing we know
with certainty is that we're going to have an integrated work force. So now what
happens? How do you now recognize the goals of the statute, which are to affect
primary conduct, and develop appropriate incentives so that this force can operate
in furtherance of the goal of the law?

complaints to several managers about coworkers' sexual harassment gave employer sufficient notice to impute
liability to employer for hostile environment); Pfau v.Reed, 125 F.3d 927 (Sth Cir. 1997), vacatedon othergrounds
by 525 U.S. 801, (supervisor was not employer's "agent" within meaning of Title V1l's definition of employer);
Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 1997) (employer responded appropriately to
employee's complaints by investigating matter and threatening co-worker with termination); Torres v. Pisano, 116
F.3d 625 (2nd Cir. 1997) (plaintiff failed to establish university's liability on ground that manager used his authority
to further the harassment or that he was aided in accomplishing the harassment by existence of agency relationship,
but knowledge of the harassment could be imputed to university based on knowledge obtained by associate director
of maintenance facilities who was harasser's supervisor); Farley v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 115 F.3d 1548
(I 1th Cir. 1997) (employee's failure to avail herself of employer's grievance procedure precluded finding that
employer had constructive knowledge of supervisor's harassment of employee); Wathen v. General Electric Co.,
115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997) (because employer took prompt and effective action after employee complained to
employer, it could not be held liable for sexual harassment); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C.Cir. 1995) (employee
could not reasonably have believed that supervisor had authority, apparent or otherwise, to sexually harass her and,
therefore, employer could not be held liable for supervisor's hostile work environment harissment of employee).
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set forth in the
The answer the Supreme Court came up with was not expressly
° They recognized the
statute. The Supreme Court created an affirmative defense.'0
need for strict liability, but then created exceptions. The Court determined that
employers would not be held strictly liable for supervisor misconduct if (1) the
employer creates effective procedures to deal with sexual harassment in the
workplace, and (2) the employer can demonstrate that this particular employee failed
to adequately avail herself of those procedures.10 '
Now, as a matter of economic modeling, this creates a very clear incentive on the
part of the employer to eradicate the taste for discrimination in the workplace. As
a result, the pressure that was otherwise pushing out into separate workplaces is now
pushing in to create a change in the environment in the workplace. Ultimately, this
decision uses economic forces to further the goals of the law-and it has done
exactly that. Employers are now actively involved in creating the required
procedures. They are mandating that there be full compliance with those procedures,
and now this internal pressure has had the effect of ejecting from the workplace
those who will not give up their taste for discrimination. People are either not being
hired because of a taste for discrimination or being fired pursuant to the operation
of the procedures.
So, the Supreme Court captured forces that were outside of legal doctrine to some
degree, but were more appropriate to deal with what was economically occurring in
the workplace. And I can tell you as a judge-although other judges may have had
different experiences-I think you can feel the way that harassment cases have now
taken on an entirely different shape than even three years ago. Employer conduct is
to a much greater degree lined up with what they expect and demand in the
workplace. People are, in fact, being terminated or they're ending their taste for
discrimination. So it really has the effect of doing exactly what the statute sought to
achieve-either get over it, or get out.
GARRETT: Those remarks demonstrate why law and economics have enjoyed
such a harmonious marriage. Law is at its base about regulating behavior and
structuring behavior through institutions, and economic- analysis concerns these
issues as well. That is not to say that's all law does. There's an aspirational element
to law. But it would be absurd to look only at the aspirational elements and not also
look at the sort of behavior modification, control, and channeling function of the
law.
Let's open this up and hear your views, discussions, questions, etc.
BRENT MANNING: 02 I'd like to comment on Judge Holmes' analysis of the
harassment situation. I guess I don't see that the prior legal theories weren't any
more suitable to achieve the desired result than the decision that ultimately came
down or that they are really any different either in the law and economics. It seems
to me that one can apply the negligence principles, for instance, and say all the
Supreme Court did is establish a bright line for what constitutes employer
negligence. If an employer is negligent in that he did not have an adequate system

100. BurlingtonIndustries, 524 U.S. at 765.
101. Id.
102. Attorney at Law, Manning, Curtis, Bradshaw & Bednar, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah.
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to address workplace harassment, then, using agency principles, the employer is
liable for the conduct of his employees. Similarly, one can say agency principles are
sufficient because you are liable for any conduct of the employee that is within the
scope of their employment or in furtherance of one of the employer's goals."°3 So
I think both get you to the same result, and that what the Supreme Court did is really
not very different from what Judge Posner or Judge Briscoe did.
HOLMES: Well, let me respond to that, taking the latter point first. I don't think
that agency principles adequately address the issue, in part because an employer is
only going to be responsible for the acts of an agent so long as the agent's actions
are within the scope of employment. But, as Judge Briscoe points out, it's rarely
within the scope of any employee's employment function to harass women in the
workplace."04
MANNING: The employer has in effect condoned such behavior.
HOLMES: Well, whether or not the employer condoned such conduct goes to the
question of whether that should be addressed as a negligence issue. That's what
Judge Posner said." 5 He effectively took your position, which is that negligence will
capture all of this conduct, but it is a form of moving negligence. That is to say
there's a moving standard of care. If you don't have a procedure effective enough
to stop this kind of behavior, which by definition you won't, then you are going to
be deemed to have violated the standard of care and therefore have committed
negligence.
Now practitioners tell me that the creation of the affirmative defense with the
concomitant strict liability has been the strongest tool that they have to make it clear
to employers that they have the responsibility to regulate employee conduct-that
it's not just the kinds of loose responsibility that come with the negligence standard
or what historically was described as the "knew of/should have known" portion of
the liability. Now they are able to tell the employers, "You will be responsible for
this. You have a proactive role to play. Otherwise, you have an economic cost if you
do not play it." And as a result, you have created an enormous and direct incentive
that employers can understand.
You can say that ultimately you might be able to reach the same result with an
overlay of negligence. But what do we really want done here? The antidiscrimination statutes are unique. The goal of the statutes is to eradicate
discrimination-to see it decline on a year-by-year basis. So if that is your real goal,
to effect primary conduct, then it's not helpful to go to an employer and say, "You
might be held liable; you might not be held liable." If you really want to achieve the
goal of the statute, you need to create an incentive for the most responsible actor
who's in the position to affect that goal, and they become the moving force.
That's what I mean by capturing that pressure and making the employer the focal
point. That will ultimately eject offending employees from the workplace. If you
lessen the employers' responsibility, then the likelihood of them taking the primary
role in achieving the goals of the statute goes down.
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §§ 219, 228, 230 (1958).
104. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated by 524 U.S. 947 (1998),
remanded to 158 F.3d 1371 (10th Cir.).
105. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 491, 507-10 (7th Cir. 1997).
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JUDGE PAUL KELLY: 0 6 I think there are problems with the two decisions you
discussed and the Harrison case. Even if you have an employer who's done
everything you've said, and puts into place the most stringent set of rules in an
attempt to avert risk, they can still have a supervisor who actually has an adverse
impact on an employee. In that scenario, the employee is excused from any
requirement to follow through, and there's absolute liability.
I think that policy will have a detrimental effect on the manner in which an
employer may respond down the road. As long as you put people together you're
going to have grabbers, harassers, and discriminators. But, then when we say to
employers that we don't really care what they've done, if there were an adverse
impact on that employee who was discriminated against, they are absolutely
liable.107 No matter how proactive the employers are--they could be policing up and
down the assembly line-once the adverse impact has occurred, there is no
affirmative defense.
HOLMES: Under Eddy Potash or under the Supreme Court cases?
KELLY: Under the Supreme Court cases. Although really under Eddy Potash
that's the rule, because the potash company had in place a very elaborate system of
procedures, which the employee did not avail herself of, supposedly because of
fear.'0 8 Ultimately that was not allowed as an affirmative defense because there was
there were an
some kind of adverse effect on the employee.'19 As I understand it, if
0
adverse effect, then your affirmative defense is out the window." I think that's
counterproductive economically.
HOLMES: You're talking about when someone is fired?
KELLY: Or when they don't get a promotion. Some adverse impact.
HOLMES: The cases describe this as a "company act."'.. I don't believe that's
necessarily counter-productive economically, because you have in fact imposed a
cost, an adverse cost, on that employee as a result of the sexual harassment.
Previously I was talking about the situation where there's not a company act, but
where there's workplace harassment, which is the hostile work environment case.
Once you have an adverse act, as you said, the law imposes liability.
But why is that? Judge Posner would say, and he did say in his concurrence in
Jansen, that even though he thinks negligence is the appropriate analysis, he would
' 2
accept strict liability if there is a "company act.""1 And that is precisely the adverse
effect that you're describing. In that situation, you have imposed an economically
adverse effect directly on somebody, as opposed to interfering with the terms and
conditions of employment in a hostile work environment.
KELLY: I would just suggest if the adverse effect is remediable, if the employee
could have availed herself of the procedures in place and gone beyond that particular
manager without any problem, then the fact that the person is a nominal supervisor,
106. Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
107. See e.g., Pierce v. Comm. Ufe Ins., 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d
773 (2nd Cir. 1994).
108. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1441.

109. See id at 1451.
110. See supra text accompanying note 99.
111. Jansen, 123 F.3d at506, 512.
112.

Id.
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or is in a position of management, shouldn't matter. I see no purpose, from an
economic standpoint, to punish an employer because one employee acted contrary
to all the rules and regulations in place that were enforceable, but the other failed to
avail herself of the system in place for dealing with such violations. So, I don't see
the result of those decisions as economically based. I understand that the cases
you've mentioned dealt with a different scenario, where there is no adverse impact
and the focus is on the offending employee, and I agree the Court adopted a rational
approach for those cases.
GARRETT: One of the larger economic questions that these discussions raised,
and that you all must deal with constantly, is the choice between rules and standards
in setting forth the law. The Civil Rights Act and Title VII created standards, not
rules. That is, they set out a general objective-to root out discrimination. But they
are not very specific about what discrimination is and what's expected of people.
Such a standard imposes significant costs on employers, the people whose conduct
has to change to meet that standard. It imposes costs on judges, who then have to
figure out what the standard means and apply it to particular cases. Judge Posner in
this case is still grappling with the standard of negligence. Then the Supreme Court
finally provides a more bright line rule: do X and Y and you'll be fine; don't do X
and Y and you're not going to be fine. That rule-like approach shifted the costs
away from some of the district courts and fact finders, maybe away from some of
the employers, but onto different people.
One of the things we learn from law and economics is to think about the
difference between rules and standards, to think about the costs institutionally, and
to think about the difficulties in setting forth behavioral rules ex post and ex ante.
DEAN MARTY BELSKY: Professor Garrett, you talked about the economic
efficiency of disclosure laws. You thought that would probably be a better way to
go than mandates. But the clear example of disclosure laws is the Security and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations. And SEC regulations have led to a messy
bureaucracy. Why wouldn't that exact same thing happen if you have to require
campaign managers, politicians, and others to monitor all of the information?
You're going to have an agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) probably,
that's going to need an enforcement division. Is that really more economically
efficient than saying no?
GARRETT: That's a great question for the following reason. All of the people
who talk about campaign finance, from Libertarians to the Brennan Center at New
York University, agree that disclosure is relatively unproblematic. These groups are
dealing with the further question of whether the law can limit contributions or
expenditures. No one is arguing about disclosure. They assume that disclosure is
unproblematic.
That viewpoint overlooks the question you raised. There is a cost to disclosure.
The current disclosure rules can be extremely difficult to comply with. Established
candidates keep lawyers busy helping them negotiate through the disclosure
requirements. The cost of disclosure falls most heavily on the groups that I'm
concerned about-grass roots groups, voices we don't already hear, challengers who

113.
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don't have much money. Thus, we ought to be as interested in justifying disclosure
rules as we are with contribution limits, expenditure limits, and the like. I think the
SEC example is an apt example; any regulatory scheme emphasizing disclosure is
costly and difficult.
What does that mean? It means you have to balance the need for information with
the awareness that there are costs to information. The more you require in terms of
disclosure, the more difficult it is going to be for smaller groups to comply with the
rules, and the more you're going to have to worry about enforcement issues.
Let me make a few observations, though. First, the fact that disclosure is costly
doesn't mean it may not, on the whole, be a good thing under some circumstances.
Second, the new technology is reducing the costs of disclosure and enforcement. We
ought to think about trying to structure the laws to be as transparent and easy to
comply with as possible, and we ought to take advantage of all the new
technology-the Internet--to think about how we require people to report, how we
post that reporting, etc.
Third, we ought to think about the sanctions. For example, the lobbying rules in
effect since 1946, and until the recent lobbying act was passed," 4 could be enforced
only through extremely stringent criminal penalties. Very few lobbyists disclosed,
but they were never prosecuted because if a court found someone guilty of failing
to disclose, the judge had to send him to prison. Well, that seemed disproportionate.
So any disclosure system should rely on civil remedies that can be easily calibrated
to the level of the offense and that allow people opportunity to remedy violations to
show their good faith.
Fourth, you'd want to have a legitimate entity to regulate. The FEC is probably
not that legitimate entity. You would have to rethink the administrative agency. The
SEC may be problematic, but it's one of the best agencies out there. The FEC is not
even in their league.
I have one final point about transactions across the Internet. Some people are
claiming that the Internet is going to transform our country into a direct democracy.
As we think about reducing costs of disclosure, we're also reducing transactions
costs involved in having all of us participate as lawmakers in decisions. There's a
new book by Dick Morris in which he argues that in the next few years we will
move to a direct democracy where we're all voting all the time on every issue that
comes up." 5 He also concludes-and this hasn't gotten a lot of press-that we're
repulsed by this outcome that we will return to a representative
going to be so
6
democracy.'
BELSKY: What do you think about a simple straightforward rule that says you
cannot do it?
GARRETT: That you can't spend money?
BELSKY: Right. Leaving aside the interpretation of the First Amendment by a
different court," 7 it seems to me the most economically efficient rule.
114. See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV 1998).
115. DICK MORRIS, VOTE.COM: How BIGMONEY LOBBYISTS ANDTHE MEDIA ARE LOSING THEIR INFLUENCE,
AND THE INTERNET IS GIVING POWER BACK TO THE PEOPLE (2000).
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GARRETT: I don't believe that it would work. I think that the hydraulic quality
of money means that it will pop up someplace else. You cannot have a
comprehensive enough system to work, so all you've done is force money into less
transparent vehicles.
JUDGE JIM STARZYNSKI:" 8 I was struck yesterday when Professor
Chemerinsky pointed out that Justice Kennedy, in the recent sovereign immunity
cases, said we should feel comfortable relying on the states to do the right thing. 1 9
He pointed out nobody on the Supreme Court would have said that in 1960 in the
civil rights cases.' 2 Here today, for example, is the suggestion that we should
require more disclosure. What if I point back to the 1960s again and pose the issues
in NAACP v. Button, which basically said we're not going to let the state of
Alabama require the NAACP to inquire who all its members were.' 2 '
I'm not quite confident enough that we've reached the stage in this democracy
that there might not still be some opprobrium that would follow some political
groups, whether you're talking potentially the Democrats, Republicans, American
Nazi Party, whoever.
GARRETT: That's an extraordinarily difficult issue. That's a part of disclosure
that the Buckley court really just dismissed. The Buckley court mentioned NAACP
v. Button 22 and noted that the challengers in Buckley argued that disclosure would
reduce the quantity of political speech because those who have disfavored
viewpoints wouldn't be willing to spend money in campaigns if their names would
be disclosed. But the court said that it didn't have any examples of suppression of
speech and that it would deal with that question on a case-by-case basis if those
problems did arise. The Court dismissed the concern in a way I think is troubling.
It's particularly troubling outside the context of candidate elections when we talk
about disclosure in direct democracy, where people spending money are affiliating
themselves with particular issues, and often those issues will be disfavored ones.
Think about some of the issues of ballot questions recently-gay rights, bilingual
education, affirmative action. Some of the voices that we've heard on these
controversial issues might have been silenced if people's names had to be disclosed.
So the more aggressive the disclosure statute, the more troubling the disclosure
issue.
But again, we return to a balancing test. The less aggressive the statute, the less
helpful it is for voter competence. How do you take account of that reality? Do you
have some kind of structure where people can make the allegation that disclosure
is particularly problematic for them in a very quick administrative proceeding? The
potential contributor argues, "I can't disclose because I will suffer very negative
consequences to disclosure." Can that be done in some kind of streamlined
administrative proceeding, where the court or the administrative agency could say,

118. Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court, District of New Mexico.
119. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) ("We are unwilling to assume the states will refuse
to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States.").
120. Prof. Chemerinsky made his comments during this conference in a keynote presentation, The Federalism
Revolution, reprinted in this volume.
121. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963).
122. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.

Winter 20011

LAW AND ECONOMICS

"Okay, in this case you're right, and we'll exempt you from disclosure"? Or is that
too burdensome? Those are questions policymakers have to grapple with. I wish I
had better answers, but that's what I've been trying to work through since I decided
to argue in favor of disclosure as the sole campaign finance regulation.
DAN WEBBER: 2 1 If I heard you right at lunch, I think you said that you had
some law-and-economics-based ideas about how the Supreme Court might have
differentiated between blanket primaries and open primaries, and you didn't get to
elaborate on that.
GARRETT: I think that the answer would be that the open primary poses less of
a threat to the political parties. Even though you can wait until the day before the
election to say, "I'm a Democrat," the parties still have more control over who
candidates are. Furthermore, there's a cost to the voter of picking one party. You
don't then get to vote in any of the races in the Republican, Green, Libertarian, or
Peace primaries. So while an open primary somewhat weakens political parties, it's
not the same kind of weakening you get with blanket primaries.
Moreover, you find some open primaries being adopted by political parties. That
happens less frequently with blanket primaries, although it occurs when parties want
to select candidates that appeal to a more diverse range of voters. If empirically
parties are willing to have open primaries, and are not intractably committed to
closed primaries, that suggests that the open primary is less threatening than the
blanket primary.
The analysis, however, should be different from Justice Scalia's approach, which
focused on the associational rights of members of political parties124 almost in the
same terms as the court talked about the associational rights of the Boy Scouts in
another case. 5 The opinions don't seem to differentiate between the associational
rights of members of a political party and of a very private institution like the Boy
Scouts.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is really a question for all three of you. It really
seems to me as if there are two levels operating in each area you discussed. Prof.
LeFrancois's idea is to get more bang for your buck on criminal action, that's the
law-and-economics idea, but underlying that idea is a clear law-and-psychology, or
law-and-anthropoldgy, or law-and-sociology concept. It seems to me that underlies
all of those areas.
LEFRANCOIS: It's true, and I think it's not surprising to the extent that we
might think of economics as a way to both understand and predict human behavior.
So it makes perfect sense that economics takes into account all kinds of social
science in its modeling. We certainly see this in the intersection between social
norms and criminal law and procedure. As I indicated, I think anthropologists would
call them mores, Freudians would call them superegos, and parents would just say
this is peer pressure. That's clearly not what we would have traditionally thought of
as economics. But I think you're exactly right about that interplay of social science.
123. United States Attorney, Oklahoma City.
124. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574-76 (2000).
125. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655-57 (2000) (holding that application of New Jersey
public accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation, violated the Boy Scouts'
right to free association).
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GARRETT: A lot of the work being done now with behavioral psychologists and
sociologists can be characterized either as economics, psychology, or sociology.
Economics is becoming a bit more sophisticated by using such techniques.
HOLMES: I think throughout all the law-and-economics literature there is a
rather defensive notion that these theories are at odds, or thought to be at odds in
some way, with traditional notions of morality or traditional notions of what drives
our legal traditions. The truth is, I think, that sometimes it sounds like they're
unrelated. We talk about things that we think are philosophically important, and then
we find that the economic model may be completely devoid of any of those guiding
principles.
But sometimes law and economics interacts and intersects with established legal
principles. I think that happens in business areas in particular, those cases that deal
with workplaces and deal with actors who operate on incentives. And as Professor
Garrett points out, if you look at voting as a market as well, then you have
opportunities to see the interactions that are not necessarily immoral, they just
simply happen to be driven by self-interest.
I think in most instances the law tries to do what's right. If you ask some people,
they'll say the law doesn't make any sense. I don't believe that. Most times when
you start working on a legal problem, you don't know a lot about it. You start out
and you think, "Where should this turn out?" It's like Dr. Capra mentioned, you start
with a working hypothesis. 26 How's it supposed to work?
The answer most times is exactly what you think it should be. The law intends to
do what is right. It really does mean to work out what's right, whether in contract
transactions, tort cases, or whatever. More often than not, economic theory also
deals with those competing self-interests and sees those individual choices and
comes to fundamentally the same result. So you have a great deal of correlation. In
business areas, we're trying to make a transaction work. That's why the two parties
got into it. Why shouldn't the legal principles correspond generally with economic
principles?
On the other hand, sometimes economic theory may depart from those things that
we think are right, but only for reasons that are starkly self-interested, as opposed
to superimposed moral decisions that we make as a society that we think are
important but that may not be economic at all. Prof. LeFrancois talked about
criminal concepts that you may view separate and apart from any economic theory,
but they are moral judgments that we make. They may be inefficient, but that's
different. Then we'll have divergence.
GARRETT: One final question before we disperse?
BELSKY: Professor Garrett, when I learned about law and economics, before
Noah and the Ark, law and economics was pure, hard cost-benefit analysis. Are you
saying that the whole school of law and economics is moving to a more touchyfeely, soft attitude?
GARRETT: There is now what's called The New Chicago School of Law and
Economics. The people who are associated with that movement are the people that

126. Dr. Capra made his remarks in a speech during the lunch given immediately before this session. His
comments were not included in this volume.
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Art talked about-Cass Sunstein, Dan Kahan, Tracey Meares, and Eric Posner,
Judge Posner's son. The group also includes scholars working at places other than
Chicago, such as Larry Lessig.' 21 They are saying that it was great to have these lawand-economics ideas at the outset, but they were simplistic. They didn't capture
reality. They helped us identify important issues, but they were not complete. So
what many of us are trying to do-and I hope I'm part of that effort-is to use those
same tools, but also use other tools from other disciplines to reach more
sophisticated conclusions. And at certain times we have to say that even when we
try to explain things the best we can, in the end we can't explain everything. And,
in the end, even if we could explain everything, we might decide for other reasons,
aspirational or moral reasons, to diverge from the economically efficient answer. So
we're really trying to make law and economics a more sophisticated, nuanced
version of what you and I learned when we were in law school.
Thank you very much.

127. Professor Lessig joined the faculty of Stanford Law School in the fall of 2000.

